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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Issues∗
A superior officer in the AFRC alleges that because he was deprived of his authority,
even though he was still formally vested with a senior position, he cannot be criminally liable
under the doctrine of command responsibility. The merit of this claim depends on the meaning
of “effective control.” To successfully convict a defendant under command responsibility, first
the definition of command responsibility must be determined, including the elements for
prosecution. Second, the evolution of command responsibility must be analyzed, with focus on
the doctrine’s status in customary international law. Finally, the mens rea requirement must be
analyzed for successful prosecution, using contemporary jurisprudence regarding command
responsibility and effective control.
Currently there is no legal distinction between “superior responsibility” and “command
responsibility.” Even so, superior responsibility more accurately reflects the evolution of
“command responsibility” because criminal liability can be imputed to civilians who are placed
in a position of authority.
B. Summary of Conclusions
The merits of this defense depend upon whether or not the defendant had “effective
control” over his subordinates. Effective control means having the material ability to prevent
and/or punish illegal actions.1 Proving effective control must be undertaken on a case-by-case

∗

This issue was raised by one of the AFRC defense counsel in his opening statement: “An alleged superior who in
fact had been deprived of his authority, although still formally vested with a senior position, cannot be held
responsible under Article 6(3) of the Statute.” Please comment on the accuracy and scope of this argument. Please
also analyze what is meant by “effective control” under the doctrine of superior responsibility?

1

Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, ¶ 840 (Dec. 17, 2004).
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 28]. ; See also, Prosecutor v. Delacic et al., Case No. IT-96-21-A,

1

basis and needs a fact driven analysis. Without specific evidentiary findings, it is difficult to
completely determine the accused’s culpability.
Superiors may be prosecuted for the offenses committed by their subordinates under
command responsibility, provided that certain conditions are satisfied. Article 6(3) of the Statute
(Statute) creating the Special Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL) identifies the duty imposed on
superiors and the general legal basis upon which they can be held liable.2
The Statute specifically creates a duty that superiors who knew or should have known
that their subordinates were about to or did commit criminal acts were required to take
reasonable measures to either prevent the acts or punish the perpetrators.3 To impute liability,
the prosecution must establish that a superior-subordinate relationship existed at the time of the
illegal acts. Holding a superior officer criminally liable for actions of his subordinates is a
bedrock principle of international law. The doctrine of Command Responsibility imposes a duty
on military commanders and civilian officers to ensure that subordinate troops adhere to the
requirements of the laws of war. The responsibility of the superior officer has direct and indirect
elements. Directly, a commander cannot order his troops to perform acts that would violate the
laws of war. Indirectly, a commander must actively halt any violations that his troops may
commit and alternatively, if the commander is unable to prevent or halt the violations, he must
punish the troops responsible for the illegal acts.

Judgment, ¶ 256 (Feb. 20, 2001) (Hereinafter “Celebici Appeals Judgment”) “The concept of effective control over
a subordinate – in the sense of a material ability to prevent or punish criminal conduct, however that control is
exercised – is the threshold to be reached in establishing a superior-subordinate relationship.” [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab 21].
2

Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (2000)
Article 6. (Hereinafter: “Statute”). Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 7].
3

Id. at art. 6(3).

2

Contemporary jurisprudence from other war crimes tribunals, notably the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR)4 have established that three elements must be proven to impute criminal liability
to a superior officer: (1) the existence of a superior/subordinate relationship; (2) knowledge by
the superior of the subordinate’s illegal acts; and (3) failure by the superior to prevent, halt or
punish the violation.
Establishing the legal connection between the superior/subordinate relationship is a
difficult task. A position of command is not necessarily determined by formal status alone. Even
though a chain of command can establish the superior/subordinate relationship, a chain of
command is not exhaustive. Under the theory of de facto command, a Court will look toward the
international community to help establish the legal relationship. Furthermore, a
superior/subordinate relationship can be shown by looking to the subjugation of orders and/or
demonstrating that an aura of authority existed at the time of the violations.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, under the leadership of Johnny Paul Koroma,
carried out a coup d’etat in 1997 against Ahmed Tejan Kabbah and his ruling government. After
usurping power, the AFRC suspended the constitution, declared law by military decree and
banned political parties.5 The AFRC also signed a peace agreement with the Revolutionary
United Front (RUF), the group that started the Sierra Leonean Civil War in 1991 when it invaded
Sierra Leone from Liberia. The period during which the AFRC reigned has been described as
lawless, “characterized by political repression, including, in particular, arbitrary arrests and
4

The Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR have the same language on this issue as the Statute of the SCSL.

5

Stuart Beresford & A.S. Miller, The Special Court for Sierra Leone: An Initial Comment, 14 LJIL 635, 637 (2001).
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 36].

3

detention, mass rape and abduction of women, forced recruitment of children and summary
executions.”6 Despite a large international outcry over the coup and subsequent UN imposed
sanctions, the AFRC/RUF alliance remained in power.
In October 1997, the AFRC/RUF signed a peace accord with Kabbah and his
government. The AFRC/RUF later violated the terms of the peace accord by stockpiling
weapons, so the international peace-keeping force from the Economic Community of West
African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) launched an operation to remove the AFRC/RUF
forces from Freetown.7 The AFRC/RUF retreated but was able to gain control of over half the
country and in January 1999 launched an attack to regain control of Freetown.8
Both sides signed the Lomè Peace Agreement on July 7, 1999.9 With the consent of the
Sierra Leone government and the RUF,10 the United Nations sent a “neutral peacekeeping force”
to Sierra Leone as pursuant to Article 16 of the Lomè Peace Agreement.11 Accordingly, on
October 22, 1999, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1270 establishing the United
Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (“UNAMSIL”).12

6

Id.

7

Id.

8

Id

.
9

Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone,
July 7, 1999. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 55].
10

Second Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1270 (1999) on the United
Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, U.N. Doc. S/2000/13, para. 4 (Jan. 11, 2000). [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at tab 9].

11

Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone,
July 7, 1999, at art. 16. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 55].

12

S.C. Res. 1270, U.N. SCOR, 4054th met., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1270 (1999). [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at tab 8].

4

Despite the Lomè accord, by October 1999, the AFRC/RUF forces were again looting
villages, burning houses, assaulting women and children sexually, and abducting children.13 The
AFRC/RUF continued committing rampant human rights violations, which included murder,
mutilation, rape, looting and abduction.14 By May 2000, tensions between UNAMSIL personnel
and members of the AFRC culminated in a series of unprovoked attacks on UNAMSIL by
AFRC and RUF forces.15 A number of UN soldier were killed and several hundred were
kidnapped and held hostage.16
Eventually the UN troops halted the AFRC/RUF and dialogue between both sides
produced the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement.17 Under the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement, the RUF
recommitted itself to the terms of the Lomè Peace Agreement by vowing to cooperate with
UNAMSIL and recommit itself to disarmament and demobilization.18
The AFRC Defendants
The three defendants in the AFRC trials, Alex Tamba Brima, Ibrahim Bazzy Kamara and
Santigie Borbor Kanu, are all charged with fourteen counts of war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.19 Mr. Brima was

13

Stuart Beresford & A.S. Miller, The Special Court for Sierra Leone: An Initial Comment, 14 LJIL 635, 637
(2001). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 36].

14

Id. at 637. See also, WITNESS TO TRUTH: REPORT OF THE SIERRA LEONE TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMMISSION,
VOL. 2 (2004) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 56].

15

Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, U.N. Doc. S/2000/455,
para. 89 (May 19, 2000). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 10].

16

Id.

17

Abuja Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front,
November 10, 2000. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 1].

18

Eighth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, U.N. Doc. S/2000/1199,
para. 2 (Dec. 15, 2000). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 11].

19

Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, SCSL – 2004-16-PT. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 19].

5

allegedly the AFRC Public Liaison Officer 2 (PLO 2) assigned to cover the Ministerial briefs of
Works and Labour, Telecommunications (Sierratel), Customs and Excise and Postal Services
and before joining the AFRC he was a Staff Sergeant in the RUF.20 Mr. Kamara was allegedly
AFRC Public Liaison Officer (PLO 3) assigned to cover the Ministerial briefs of Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries, Energy and Power, Lotto and Income Tax and before joining the AFRC
he was also a Staff Sergeant in the RUF.21 Mr. Kanu was allegedly a member of the AFRC
Supreme Council and was a Lance Corporal in the RUF before he joined the AFRC.22 These
defendants were allegedly in command positions during the invasion and subsequent retreat of
Freetown in January 1999 in which over 5,000 civilians were murdered.23 One of these
defendants claims that he was a “superior” in name only, (i.e. he held a formal title, but had no
actual authority or power even though he was allegedly Number Three in the AFRC leadership
structure). The defense also asserts that this defendant had no control or the authority to issue
orders, and/or was absent at all relevant times.
III. LEGAL DISCUSSION
A. Definition of Command Responsibility
Superior officers, both military officers and civilian leaders, can be prosecuted under the
doctrine of Superior Responsibility, commonly referred to as Command Responsibility.
Command Responsibility is a well-settled principle of international law whereby a commander

20

WITNESS TO TRUTH: REPORT OF THE SIERRA LEONE TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, VOL. 2 (2004)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 56]

21

Id.

22

Id.

23

Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu, SCSL – 2004-16-PT, Indictment (2004). [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at tab 19].

6

can be held criminally liable for violations of the laws of war if he (1) orders such violations or
(2) fails to prevent, halt or punish violations.24 The statute of the SCSL provides for two
separate grounds of criminal responsibility. Under Article 6, persons accused of violations of
international humanitarian law25 may be charged separately or concurrently with individual or
superior responsibility.
Direct individual criminal responsibility requires a direct link between the accused and
the violation,26 whereas Command Responsibility imputes criminal liability to superiors who are
under an obligation to act. 27 Under this doctrine, a direct link between the accused and the
offence is not necessary. Rather, it is the failure to act which results in criminal responsibility.
Article 6(3) states:
The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute was
committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal
responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was
about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior had failed to take the
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the
perpetrators thereof.28

24

Carol Fox, Closing a Loophole in Accountability for War Crimes: Successor Commander’s Duty to Punish Known
Past Offenses, 55 Case W. Res. 443, 445 (2004). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 39].

25

See Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (2000), at Art. 6(1) and
6(3). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 7]. The term “international humanitarian law” specifically
refers to the crimes articulated in Article 2, Article 3, and Article 4 of the Statute. The crimes are “Crimes Against
Humanity,” “Violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II,” and
“Other serious violations of international humanitarian law.”

26

Article 6(1) of the SCSL Statute provides: “A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise
aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present
Statute shall be individually responsible for the crime.”

27

Kirsten M.F. Keith, The Mens Rea of Superior Responsibility as Developed by ICTY Jurisprudence, 14 Leiden
Journal of Int’l Law, 617, 618 (2001). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 43].

28

Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (2000) at art. 6(3).
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 7].
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This provision not only grants the prosecution the opportunity to try an accused for the failure to
prevent a subordinate from committing illegal acts or for failing to punish a subordinate for
violating the laws and customs of war, but it also makes clear that three elements must be proven
before a person can be convicted under Command Responsibility: (1) subordination, (2)
knowledge, and (3) the failure to act.
These elements are compulsory and therefore a commander is not responsible for crimes
committed by subordinates simply because he is in a position of authority.29 The ICTY’s statute
is similarly worded,30 stating that the three compulsory elements of superior responsibility
include: (1) the existence of a superior – subordinate relationship; (2) the superior knew or had
reason to know that the criminal act was about to be or had been committed (proper mens rea);
and (3) the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal
act or to punish the perpetrators thereof, (i.e. fails to prevent, halt or punish violations).31 ICTY

29

Ilias Bantekas, The Contemporary Law of Superior Responsibility, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 573, 577 (1999).
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 35].
30

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, UN Doc. S/25704, annex (1993), at Art
7(3) reads: “The fact that any of the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute was committed by a
subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the
subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and that superior failed to take the necessary and
reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.” [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at tab 5].
31

Kirsten M.F. Keith, The Mens Rea of Superior Responsibility as Developed by ICTY Jurisprudence, 14 Leiden
Journal of Int’l Law (2001), 617, 618. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 43]. See also; Celebici
Appeals Judgment, [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 21]. Confirmed in Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic,
Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 294 (March 3, 2000). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 17];
Prosecutor v. Zˇ latko Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 69 (June 25, 1999). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab 16]; Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T,
Judgment, ¶ 401 (Feb. 26, 2001). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 27]; Prosecutor v. Dragoljub
Kunarac and Radomir Kova , Case No. IT-96-23, Judgment, ¶ 395 Trial Chamber, (Feb. 22, 2001). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab 29].

8

case law confirms that “the imposition of criminal culpability is intended to create an incentive
to insure that subordinates abide by the humanitarian law of war.”32
B. Historical Development of Command Responsibility
The elements of Command Responsibility have evolved over centuries, beginning with
Sun Tzu in 500 B.C.33 Significantly, in 1439, King Charles VII of France outlined a clear duty
for commanders to punish subordinates for abuses and other offenses committed during war
time. If the commanding officer failed to properly punish the offender, the commander was
deemed to be responsible for the offense as if he had committed it himself.34 Moreover, in 1474,
Peter von Hagenbach was tried by a special tribunal of the Holy Roman Empire for failing to
prevent his subordinates from committing rape, murder, perjury and other laws of God and man.
Hagenbach was stripped of his knighthood and executed.35
In 1863, the United States issued the Lieber Code, also known as General Order No. 100,
which provided that commanders can be punished for ordering or encouraging the intentional
wounding or killing of an already disabled enemy.36 Two years after the adoption of the Lieber
Code, Captain Henry Wirz was tried and convicted for violating it because he ordered the
torture, mistreatment and death of Union soldiers while the soldiers were held at a Confederate

32

Matthew Lippman, Humanitarian Law: The Uncertain Contours of Command Responsibility, 9 Tulsa J. Comp. &
Int’l L. 1 (2001). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 44].

33

Major William H. Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1973). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab 48].

34

Carol Fox, Closing a Loophole in Accountability for War Crimes: Successor Commander’s Duty to Punish Known
Past Offenses, 55 Case W. Res. 443, 447 (2004) (citation omitted). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab
39].

35

Id. at 447.

36

Major William H. Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1973). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab 40].
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prisoner of war camp that was under his sole command.37 Some scholars argue that Wirz was
held to a strict liability standard because he was helpless to prevent the mistreatment of the
detainees.38 Regardless, the Wirz decision helped lead the way for the codification of the
doctrine of Command Responsibility.
The international community first codified the doctrine of Command Responsibility
during the Hague Convention (IV) respecting the laws and customs of war on land in 1907. The
Hague Convention was ratified by forty-one countries and was a “manifestation and codification
of that which was custom among the signatory nations, giving early recognition to the duties and
responsibilities of commanders.”39 Despite this early codification, this Convention did not
address individual criminal culpability; Article 3 provided for holding a State responsible for
violations of laws by its military.40 Nevertheless, Article 43 of the Annex to the Convention
required that commanders of occupying forces “shall take all measures to restore and ensure, as
far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in
force in the country.”41 This early codification set the framework for more comprehensive
codifications after World War I.
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39

Major William H. Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 11 (1973). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at tab 48].

40

Carol Fox, Closing a Loophole in Accountability for War Crimes: Successor Commander’s Duty to Punish Known
Past Offenses, 55 Case W. Res. 443, 450 (2004). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 39]. See also,
Stuart L. Hendin, Command Responsibility and Superior Orders in the Twentieth Century – A Century of Evolution,
10 MURDOCH UNIVERSITY ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF LAW 4, (2003). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab
40].
41

Major William H. Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1973) (citation
omitted). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 48].

10

Following World War I, the Allies appointed the Commission on the Responsibility of
the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties during the Preliminary Peace
Conference at Versailles. This Commission recommended that an international tribunal should
try individuals who were accused of committing violations of the laws of war. “All persons
however high their position may have been who have been guilty of offences against the laws
and customs of war or the laws of humanity, are liable to criminal prosecution.”42 Although, this
tribunal never came to fruition, the international community had finally codified individual
criminal culpability and it sought to combine the recent codifications to prosecute military
officers after World War II.
1. In Re Yamashita
The prosecution of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, commander of Japanese forces in the
Philippines during World War II, was the first, and arguably the most important Command
Responsibility case arising from World War II. This case was also unique because the Supreme
Court of the United States reviewed the decision.
General Yamashita was charged with failing to discharge his duty as commander to
control soldiers under his command, and he was held criminally liable for the murder, rape, and
abuse of over 35,000 Philippine civilians and prisoners of war. A special American military
tribunal convened by General MacArthur tried Yamashita. Despite the scope of the atrocities of
the crimes, the prosecution could not establish a direct link between Yamashita and the
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commission of the criminal acts.43 Yamashita defended himself, arguing that personally, he
“knew nothing of any of the atrocities” due to the “complete breakdown of communications
incident to the swift and overpowering advance of the American forces.” He further stated that
“his troops were disorganized and out of control, leaving the inference that he could not have
prevented the atrocities even had he known of them.”44 Because a direct link between the crimes
and Yamashita was not established, Yamashita’s fate hinged upon his knowledge (i.e. whether
General Yamashita knew or should have known of the abuses committed by his troops). The
Commission concluded:
It is absurd to consider a commander a murderer or rapist because one of his
soldiers commits a murder or rape. Nevertheless, where murder and rape and
vicious, revengeful actions are widespread offenses, and there is no effective
attempt by a commander to discover and control the criminal acts, such a
commander may be held responsible, even criminally liable, for the lawless acts
of his troops, depending upon their nature and the circumstances surrounding
them.45

Upon this finding, the tribunal convicted Yamashita because “[Yamashita] failed to provide
effective control of [the] troops as was required by the circumstances.”46 Yamashita was held to
a “should have known” standard because the abuses committed during his command were so
rampant. Accordingly, a commanding officer’s knowledge can be presumed upon a finding of a

43
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large number of atrocities, geographically and temporally, in relation to the superior’s
command.47
In an attempt to save Yamashita from execution, his lawyers argued for clemency, stating
that “this is the first time in modern history that a commanding officer had been held criminally
liable for acts committed by his troops. The Commission created a new crime. The accused
could not have known, nor could a sage have predicted, that at some time in the future a Military
Commission would decree [these] acts to be a crime.”48 Next, Yamashita’s defense team
appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, alleging that Yamashita’s conviction was
unconstitutional on three grounds: (1) the military commission that tried Yamashita was illegal;
(2) the prosecution failed to state an offense against the laws of war; and (3) the laws governing
the Commission denied Yamashita’s right to a fair trial, a right to which Yamashita was
entitled.49 Because the first and third grounds are based solely on the United States’
Constitution, only the second ground is relevant here.
Despite a strong dissenting opinion by Justice Rutledge, who disapproved of Yamashita’s
conviction because he was convicted of a “crime defined after his conduct, alleged to be
criminal, [had] taken place,”50 the majority upheld the decision of the Commission. The Court
first addressed the question of command responsibility:

47
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It is evident that the conduct of military operations by troops whose excesses are
unrestrained by the orders or efforts of their commander would almost certainly
result in the violations which it is the purpose of the law of war to prevent. Its
purpose to protect the civilian population and prisoners of war from brutality
would largely be defeated if the commander of an invading army could with
impunity neglect to take reasonable measures for their protection. Hence the law
of war presupposes that its violation is to be avoided through the control of the
operations of war by commanders who are to some extent responsible for their
subordinates.51
The Court cited various provisions regarding Command Responsibility from Articles 1 and 43 to
the Annex of the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907, Article 19 of the Tenth Hague Convention,
and Article 26 of the Geneva Red Cross Convention of 1929 as its impetus to conclude that
Yamashita violated known principles of the law of wars.52 In particular, the Court held that: (1)
a commander had a duty to control the conducts of his subordinates, ensuring their compliance
with the law of war; and (2) where such a duty exists a superior can be charged with being in
violation of the law of war even if he did not personally participate in or order the illegal acts.53
In Re Yamashita established modern-day command responsibility. General Yamashita
was, by virtue of his position as commander of the Japanese forces in the Philippines, under an
“affirmative duty to take such measures as were within his power and appropriate in the
circumstances to protect prisoners of war and the civilian population.”54 From 1945 onward,
superiors knew they had an affirmative responsibility to utilize all means within their control to
prevent their subordinates from committing war crimes.
2. The High Command and Hostages Cases – X and XI Trials of War Criminals before the
Nuremburg Military Tribunals
51

Id. at 15.
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The High Command Case, 55 which tried thirteen high-ranking German officers, and The
Hostages Case, 56 which tried twelve high-ranking German officers, involved indirect command
responsibility. These cases were tried before the American military tribunals under Control
Council Law No. 10.57 The Nuremburg cases refined the Yamashita precedent and established a
burden on prosecutors to prove indirect command responsibility where the commander’s “failure
to properly supervise his subordinates constitutes criminal negligence.”58
The High Command case distinguished itself from the strict liability standard outlined In
Re Yamashita by setting an arduous standard for imputing Command Responsibility:
…it is not considered under the situation outlined that criminal responsibility
attached to [the commander] merely on the theory of subordination and over-all
command. He must be shown both to have had knowledge and to have been
connected with such criminal acts, either by way of participation or criminal
acquiescence.59
This legal reasoning departed from In re Yamashita in that it declared invalid the assumption that
a commanding officer must have known about widespread atrocities committed by his
subordinates.60 Despite this new higher standard, the defendants were convicted. The High
Command Case also addressed the issue where command authority has allegedly been removed
55
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from a commander. The Tribunal stated that a court should examine both objective and
subjective factors in considering the validity of any such defense.61
Furthermore, the High Command case established the precedent that a superior’s duty to
punish subordinates extends to violations that occurred before that superior officer assumed
authority. “Field Marshal von Kuechler was held responsible for the illegal execution of Red
Army soldiers which occurred before (and after) he took up command, on the basis that word of
all of these executions was reported to his headquarters after he assumed command, yet he took
no punitive action.”62
In the Hostage case, like in Yamashita and the High Command case, there was not any
question as to whether or not the offenses occurred. Rather, the crux of the indictments revolved
around the standard of responsibility. The Tribunal first held:
That a general who was in command of an occupied territory was accountable for
conduct of all units within the scope of the territory in question irregardless of the
chain of command. This meant that the territorial commander had not only
military command authority, but as well, was deemed to have ‘executive’
authority over the territory in question. As a matter of fundamental principle the
Tribunal held the territorial commander…could not in due course plead as a
defence that he had no knowledge that the crimes had taken place.63
The Tribunal expounded upon the High Command case precedent requiring “proof of a
causative, overt act or omission from which a guilty intent can be inferred before a verdict of
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guilty will be pronounced.”64 To be held criminally liable, the Tribunal in the Hostage case
declared that an officer “must be one who orders, abets, or takes a consenting part in the
crime.”65 Officers were considered to have abetted in or consented to the crime when they
ignored reports of the violations and, if having power to stop them permitted them to continue.66
Thus, responsibility of the crime was imputed to the commander if the commander did not
punish his subordinates for offenses.
3. 1977 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, Articles 86 and 87
Even though Nuremburg tried and convicted war criminals under this theory of
Command Responsibility, it was not until 1977 that Command Responsibility was explicitly
codified internationally. The 1977 Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Convention, applicable
to international armed conflicts, states in Article 86(2):
The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was committed by a
subordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal or disciplinary
responsibility, as the case may be, if they knew, or had information which should
have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the time, that he was
committing or was going to commit such a breach and if they did not take all
feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach.67
It is important to note that Article 86 makes no distinction between military and civilian
superiors. Therefore, all superiors are required to “prevent or repress” grave breaches, which
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“implies the obligation to enact legislation laying down effective penal sanctions for perpetrators
of such breaches.”68
Article 87 outlines the specific duties of military commanders. The commanders are
under an affirmative duty to report breaches of the Geneva conventions committed by armed
forces under their control and others who are under their control. And where necessary, the
commanders must initiate disciplinary and/or penal action.69 Reference to “commanders” in
Article 87 included persons in command “at the highest level to leaders with only a few men
under their command.”70 This unnecessary distinction of rank in attributing Command
Responsibility indicates that the international lawmaking community looks to actual and
effective control, instead of formality.71 The drafters of Protocol I sought to codify the standards
established by the military tribunals of World War II by imputing responsibility to a commander
when he had not intervened to prevent a breach of the laws of war or put a stop to it.72
4. Contemporary Statutes
Consistent with the language of Protocol 1, the statutes of the ICTY and ICTR, and the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), do not distinguish between military and
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civilian superiors.73 Indeed, the statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR use the same plain language
when explaining criminal liability for superiors.74 Significantly, the ICTR statute extends
Command Responsibility to internal conflicts.75 In the same way that the ICTR and ICTY
statutes impute liability to both military and civilian leaders,76 the statute for the SCSL imputes
liability as well. Thus decisions reached by the ICTY and ICTR regarding Command
Responsibility should be viewed as particularly persuasive by the SCSL because all three
tribunals are operating under the same legal guidelines.
5. Applying Command Responsibility
The prosecution has the burden to establish three elements in order to successfully
prosecute a superior: (1) the existence of a superior/subordinate relationship; (2) the superior
knew or had reason to know that the offense was either previously committed or about to be
committed; and (3) the superior fails to halt or prevent the offenses, or fails to punish the
perpetrators. Although these elements seem straightforward, International Tribunals have a
difficult and complex task in applying command responsibility:
The action required depends on when the superior knew or should have known
about the crime. A person who has the authority and the opportunity to prevent a
73
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crime and fails to do so is to some extent responsible for the fact that the crime
occurred. Similarly, a person who learns that a subordinate has committed a
crime and fails to take measures to punish the perpetrator is not only condoning
the crime committed but also sending a signal that such crimes can be committed
with impunity, thereby encouraging rather than deterring the commission of
additional crime in the future. In such circumstances, the superior’s failure to act
may be viewed as contributing to the commission of the crime or as implicating
the International Tribunal to determine the degree of culpability of a superior for a
crime committed by a subordinate in light of the facts and circumstances of the
case and bearing in mind the exceptional nature of this basis for individual
criminal responsibility.77
a. Establishing a Superior-Subordinate Relationship
In order to successfully impute criminal liability to a superior or commanding officer a
superior-subordinate must be established.78 Under modern international jurisprudence a
commander or superior is “the one who possesses the power or authority in either a de jure or a
de facto form to prevent a subordinate’s crime or to punish the perpetrators of the crime after the
crime is committed.”79 Proving a superior-subordinate relationship can therefore be established
in two independent ways, de jure and de facto.80 Both ways are necessary because as the Court
in Celebici noted:
The power or authority to prevent or to punish does not solely arise from de jure
authority conferred through official appointment. In many contemporary
conflicts, there may be only de facto, self-proclaimed governments and therefore
de facto armies and paramilitary groups subordinate thereto. Command structure,
77
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organized hastily, may well be in disorder and primitive. To enforce the law in
these circumstances requires a determination of accountability not only of
individual offenders but of their commanders or other superiors who were, based
on evidence, in control of them without, however a formal commission or
appointment. A tribunal could find itself powerless to enforce humanitarian law
against de facto superiors if it only accepted as proof of command authority a
formal letter of authority, despite the fact that the superiors acted at the relevant
time with all the power that would attach to an officially appointed superior or
commander.81
Regardless of which type of command is shown, in order for an accused to be criminally liable
under the doctrine of Command Responsibility, a superior-subordinate relationship must have
existed between the perpetrator and accused at the relevant time.82
i. Effective Control is Required for Liability Under Command Responsibility and is
Measured by the Ability of a Superior to Prevent and/or Punish the Crimes
A commander must have effective control over his subordinates in order to be convicted
under Command Responsibility. “It is settled in the jurisprudence of the International Tribunal
(ICTY) that the ability to exercise effective control is necessary for the establishment of superior
responsibility.”83 It would be utterly unfair to impute criminal liability to a person if he had no
way to shape the actions of the people who actually committed the offenses.
Effective control is not based on rank, authority or respect, but is the genuine operational
power, and is determined by a superior’s ability to prevent offenses, or conversely to punish
perpetrators if the offenses have already occurred. The threshold that must be reached when
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establishing a superior-subordinate relationship is the material ability to prevent or punish
criminal conduct.84 Assessing which factors determine effective control is discussed below.
ii. De Jure Command
De jure command traditionally is established by an official delegation of command from
a pertinent office.85 This power can be evidenced by “formal executive structures, such as state
entities [vesting] such authority by passing legislative acts.”86 Even if power is formally
delegated to a commander, formal status alone does not determine the superior position. The
accused can be found to possess the right to control subordinates even if no formal grant of
authority is proved.87
When trying to establish de jure command, the hierarchical structure of the military or
paramilitary group in question must be analyzed. In other words, “the nature of the
‘organization’ must be discerned, specifically its capacity to delegate further authority.”88
Discerning an organization’s structure becomes far more complicated when the organization is
not a formal entity, like a state. Nevertheless, most organizations, whether military or civilian,
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are built on a hierarchical model. This vertical scale seeks to effectively dispense the dictates of
the decision-makers down to the soldiers on the battlefield and generally assumes four basic
stages of command.89 The four stages are: (1) policy command, which determines broad policy
objectives; (2) strategic command, where the upper echelon of military commanders create
viable military plans to achieve the broad policy goals; (3) operational command, led by senior
military commanders who command midlevel groupings of forces; and (4) tactical command,
carried out by lower-level commanders who exercise direct control over troops usually on the
battlefield.90 Depending on effective control and the knowledge requirement (discussed below) a
commander at any of these four stages could conceivably be held criminally responsible under
superior responsibility.
Once de jure command is established, the prosecutor has met the first threshold of
proving a superior-subordinate relationship. However, effective control must also be proven.
“In general, the possession of de jure power in itself may not suffice for the finding of command
responsibility if it does not manifest effective control, although a court may presume that
possession of such power prima facie results in effective control unless proof to the contrary is
produced.”91 Once de jure authority has been established, the burden is shifted to the defense to
prove that the accused lacked effective control. It follows that, “A commander vested with de
jure authority who does not, in reality, have effective control over his or her subordinates would
not incur criminal responsibility pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility.”92
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iii. De Facto Command
De facto command is subject to proof of corresponding subordinates, but this type of
command does not need to further a military or civilian function.93 Because de facto command
usually lacks the paper-trail evidence that de jure command relies upon for demonstration,
tribunals and courts should assess a superior’s status “through an analysis of the distribution of
tasks” within a specific combat unit.94 The term “superior” is not limited to people who are
higher in rank than the perpetrators.95
iv. Factors Used To Determine Effective Control
Many different factors can be used to show that a superior had effective control over his
or her subordinates. “Factors indicative of an accused’s position of authority and effective
control may include the official position held by the accused, his capacity to issue orders, the
position of the accused within the military or political structure and the actual tasks that he
performed.”96 For instance, “signed orders and documents will support a charge of command
liability when they provide evidence of such a relationship, irrespective of the importance of the
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order.”97 Command Responsibility can also be deduced from the distribution of tasks within a
unit.98 When identifying an operational superior through the distribution of tasks, reliance is
often placed on the testimony of international monitoring or humanitarian aid personnel.99
Prosecutors from both the ICTY and ICTR have attempted to establish effective de facto control
over subordinates even where there is overwhelming evidence that the accused was officially
appointed, because in civil wars, de jure command might only paint half the picture.100 Even so,
concurrence of de facto and de jure command, while helpful to reflect liability, is not necessary
for an accused to be found guilty under Command Responsibility.
The factors that help demonstrate effective control must be analyzed on a case-by-case
basis. “As to whether the superior has the requisite level of control, this is a matter which must
be determined on the basis of the evidence presented in each case.”101 Furthermore, “In all
circumstances, and especially when an accused is alleged to have been a member of collective
bodies with authority shared among various members, it is appropriate to assess on a case-bycase basis the power or authority actually devolved on an accused, taking into account the
cumulative effect of the accused’s various functions.”102 Determining effective control must be
97

Ilias Bantekas, The Contemporary Law of Superior Responsibility, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 573, 582 (1999).
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 35]
98

Id. at 583.

99

Id. at 581. (Citing the Vukovar Hospital case, where such testimony established that Major Sljivancanin “behaved
like a commander and took the decisions” over and above his superior, 108 ILR 53 (1998) and Prosecutor v. Rajic,
where evidence from international observers testified that the accused proclaimed himself as the commander of the
forces responsible for annihilating a Muslim village.)

100

Id. at 584.

101

Prosecutor v. Halilovic, Case No. IT-01-48-T, Judgment, ¶ 63 (Nov. 16, 2005). [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at tab 24]; See also, Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgment, ¶ 366 (Jan. 31, 2005).
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at tab 32].
102

Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 277 (Sept. 1, 2004). [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at tab 20].

25

determined on an individual basis and based on specific evidentiary findings. Once effective
control and the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship have been established, the
prosecution must then prove that the accused satisfied the second element of Command
Responsibility.
b. The Knowledge Requirement
The mens rea element in Article 6(3) comprises two elements; “Knew” and “Had reason
to know.” The knowledge element means that the accused did not have to have the intent to
commit the offenses in question, only that he knew or had reason to know that his subordinates
were about to commit the offense or had committed the offense, and that the subordinates
possessed the requisite specific intent.103 Each of these knowledge requirements will be
examined in turn.
i. “Knew”
Under the doctrine of Command Responsibility the element “knew” is split into two
separate parts: actual knowledge and constructive knowledge.104
Actual knowledge can be proved either through direct or circumstantial evidence.105
Often, actual knowledge is difficult to prove because it requires affirmative evidence that the
accused knew of the crimes committed or about to be committed. This type of knowledge is
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regarded as the highest standard of knowledge.106 Types of evidence that could provide proof of
actual knowledge include: written reports of the crime that are addressed to the accused and
which were received by the accused; written reports, letters, or orders issued by the accused;
testimony proving that oral complaints were directly made to the accused; and testimony that the
accused made oral statements proving he knew of the crimes.107
If there is no direct evidence linking the accused to the offenses, constructive knowledge
may be established through circumstantial evidence alone.108 The circumstantial evidence must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had actual knowledge. Some argue that this is
essentially a “must have known” standard because the evidence indicates that there is no other
logical hypothesis other than the accused must have known of the crimes.109 There are many
types of circumstantial evidence that can be used including the number of illegal acts, the types
of illegal acts, the scope of illegal acts, the logistics involved, the geographical location of the
acts, the widespread occurrence of the acts, the tactical tempo of the operations, the modus
operandi of similar illegal acts, and the location of the commander at the time.110 This list is not
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exhaustive. Additionally, some argue that media reports as well as communications systems
could be used to prove constructive knowledge.111
ii. “Had Reason to Know”
Aside from actual knowledge, the Statute creates criminal responsibility under a “had
reason to know” standard. As used in Article 86(2) of the Geneva Protocol I (1997) this standard
should be construed to have the same meaning as the phrase “had information enabling them to
conclude.”112 “This standard creates an objective negligence test which takes into full account
the circumstances at the time.”113 The Celebici Appeals Chamber interpreted the “Had reason to
know” standard as “[a] superior will be criminally responsible through the principles of Superior
Responsibility only if information was available to him which would have put him on notice of
offences committed by subordinates.”114 This ruling has been adopted by the ICTY and the
ICTR as the definitive standard.115 As a result, a superior can only be liable under Command
Responsibility “if he had information available to him which would have provided him with
notice of the offences about to be committed or committed and he subsequently failed to take any
preventive or punitive measures.”116 The “had reason to know” standard is not a strict liability
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standard like the one found in In re Yamashita. Once a superior is put on notice of the offenses,
he has a duty to take further action or he risks being held criminally liable. While this standard
rejects a presumption of knowledge, it also rejects pleas of ignorance, even if a commander’s
ignorance is genuine.117 Because the “had reason to know” standard relies upon circumstantial
evidence, establishing the requisite standard of knowledge will vary heavily in each individual
case depending upon evidentiary findings.
6. Contemporary Jurisprudence in the ICTY and ICTR
The defendant who is the subject of this inquiry is offering a unique and novel defense.
He is arguing that he had de jure control over subordinates in the AFRC, but yet lacked de facto
control. In Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Jean Kambanda was found guilty of genocide, conspiracy
to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, complicity in genocide
and crimes against humanity.118 Kambanda was Prime Minister of the Interim Government of
Rwanda and he headed the 20-member Council of Ministers. Because of his formal title, he had
de jure authority over the other members of the government.119 Kambanda admitted to attending
meetings with other members of his government during which, “the course of the massacres
were actively followed, but no action was taken to stop them.”120 Kambanda did not have de
facto control over any subordinates who personally committed the atrocities against the Tutsi
civilian population. Nevertheless, the ICTR held him criminally liable because his formal title
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granted him de jure authority and he refused to either take appropriate measures to stop the
genocide or punish the violators.
In Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar, the defendant was a high-ranking commander of a wellorganized and well-structured army with a clearly delineated chain of command.121 Although he
did not personally carry out the illegal shelling and subsequent killings that occurred on the Old
Town of Dubrovnik, he was convicted under Article 7(3) of the ICTY statute. The Court found
that because he was the commander, he had effective control over the perpetrators of the
unlawful shelling and had the material ability to stop the shelling and punish the perpetrators.122
Instead of halting the illegal shelling or punishing the perpetrators, or even conducting an
investigation into the illegal acts, Strugar did nothing even though he knew about the illegal
acts.123 His failure to act resulted in his conviction because he satisfied the elements of
Command Responsibility.
The majority of contemporary cases of the ICTY and ICTR address the issue of
extending Command Responsibility to civilian superiors. The few cases that deal with
Command Responsibility imputed to a military commander turn on the issue of effective control.
Without specific facts about this defendant’s position, location and alleged acts or omissions, it is
nearly impossible to fully analyze his culpability. “The indicators of effective control are more a
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matter of evidence than substantive law.”124 Thus, a fact driven analysis is needed to evaluate
the veracity of this defendant’s claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
A military commander or civilian superior can be held liable for the criminal acts of his
subordinates under the doctrine of Command Responsibility. Establishing Command
Responsibility rests on proving three material elements: (1) a superior-subordinate relationship;
(2) knowledge by the superior of the subordinate’s actions; and (3) the failure by the superior to
prevent, halt or punish the violations. A superior-subordinate relationship can be demonstrated
by proving a formal hierarchical command structure, which is typical of most armed forces,
existed or by showing the accused had de facto control over the troops in question. The
knowledge requirement can be proven by providing direct evidence that the superior knew about
the offences being committed or about to be committed. Knowledge can also be shown by
circumstantial evidence demonstrating that the accused “had reason to know” about the offenses.
Once a superior knows about the violations by his troops, he is under an affirmative duty to act
to prevent, halt or punish violations. If the superior fails to act, he may be prosecuted under
Command Responsibility.
The AFRC defendant claims that even though he had de jure authority he lacked effective
control over his subordinates. In order to convict this defendant under Command Responsibility,
it must be shown that he in fact had effective control over his soldiers. Absent specific
evidentiary findings, it would be an incredulous assumption that a military commander with de
jure authority has no actual control over his troops and no authority to punish his troops for
failing to obey orders.
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